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• Real project 
experience shows that 
reliability models can 
predict reliability and 
help develop test 
strategies. This case 
study reports on 
IBM's approach to 
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eliability models 
are a powerful tool for predicting, con-
trolling, and assessing software reliabil-
ity. In combination, these functions let 
an organization determine if the relia-
bility goals it sets for its software have 
been met. 
At a recent conference, many practi-
tioners reported on the increasing and in-
creasingly successful use of reliability 
measurement. 1 One of the most impor-
tant examples was its use on the US space 
shuttle.2 The space-shuttle case study is 
an excellent example of how a real project 
team can evaluate candidate reliability 
models and select the models that best 
match the software's failure history. 
In this article, we share the experience 
of a team at IBM Federal Services Com-
pany in Houston, which evaluated many 
reliability models, tried to validate them 
for use on this project, and selected the 
Schneidewind model to predict the relia-
074~7459/92/0700/0028/$03 DO© IEEE 
bilitv of the shuttle's on-board system 
so~are for the National Aeronauti~s and 
Space Administration. 
The approach reported here is experi-
mental - it is not current practice 
throughout IBM. The output of the 
Schneidewind model is used by this shut-
tle project only, and only to add confi-
dence to low failure probabilities that are 
based on fonnal certification processes. 
However, the IBM team has judged that 
this application successfully models the 
software's failure history. 
The techniques the IBM team used to 
apply a reliability model and the underly-
ing concepts should be of value to others 
who must perform similar studies and 
model evaluations. 
USING MODELS TO PREDICT 
Three separate but related functions 
comprise an integrated reliability program: 
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+ Prediction is the activity of estimat-
ing the future failure rate, number of 
failures, time to next failure, and mean 
time to failure, where a failure is "the 
inability of a system or system compo-
nent to perform a re~uired function 
within specified limits." 
+ Control is the activity of comparing 
predictions with predefined goals and 
flagging software that fails to meet those 
goals. 
+ Assessment is the activity of determin-
ing what action to take when software fails 
to meet goals. For example, you might in-
tensify inspection or testing, redesign the 
software, or revise the process. Formulat-
ing test strategies, which is also part of as-
sessment, involves determining the prior-
ity, duration, and completion date of 
testing and allocating personnel and com-
puter resources to testing. 
Satisfying assumptions. To ensure that sta-
tis tical modeling successfully predicts reli-
ability, you must thoroughly understand 
precisely how the predictions are to be in-
terpreted and applied and by whom. Busi-
ness and military decisions could vary sig-
nificantly in response to perceptions of 
reliability, based on interpretations of the 
predictions and their credibility. 
To validate a model's appropriateness 
for an application, you must address each 
assumption the model makes. For exam-
ple, the Schneidewind model4 assumes 
that a system is modified only in immedi-
ate response to an observed failure. It as-
sumes that the process used to correct the 
code is constant, implying that for each 
error corrected there is an inherent, fixed 
probability of introducing additional er-
rors. It also assumes that all code in a pro-
gram is homogeneous from the stand-
point of execution history. 
For many systems that are sequentially 
upgraded, these assumptions appear at 
first to represent significant incompatibil-
ities. However, as this case study illus-
trates, these restrictions can be accommo-
dated by carefully analyzing the elements 
of a complete software system and its asso-
ciated processes. 
Systems as components. To apply your 
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data to a reliability model, consider break-
ing your systems and processes into 
smaller elements that can more accurately 
satisfy assumptions and constraints. If you 
think of each software version as a combi-
nation of code subsets that have a known 
oped for a system's first release is the mig-
ina! version, labeled version A in Figure 1. 
Because all the code in version A was re-
leased for the first time, the subset of the 
total system that was new was in fact the 
entire version. This subset is labeled new-
failure history and homo-
geneous execution his-
tory, you can more readily 
accommodate a model's 
assumptions. 
The IBM team used 
this approach to deal with 
the Schneidewind mod-
el's assumptions. The 
shuttle's Primary Avionics 
Software Subsystem is 
modified frequently, 
using a constantly im-
proving process, to add or 
change capabilities. More 
than 15 versions of PASS 
If you think of each 
version as a combination 
of code subsets that have 
a known fuilure history, 
you can more readi~ 
accommodate a model's 
assumptions. 
code subset a in Figure 1; 
all of subset a begins op-
eration when version A is 
released. 
When the system is 
updated and rereleased as 
version B, only the lines 
of code that were modi-
fied or added are included 
in new-code subset b. 
The remainder of subset 
a is carried over from 
version A and has been 
in use in its unchanged 
form since version A's 
have been released to NASA since 1980, 
each an upgrade of the preceding version. 
release. The new-code 
subset b, on the other hand, begins op-
eration when version B is released. 
Figure 1 shows one way to depict a se-
quentially upgraded system. Code devel-
All of version B is carried over to ver-
sion C, unless it is modified, in which case 
Version A 
Carryover from A 
New code 
Version C 
Carryover from A 
New-code subset (a) 
Previous-code subset (b) 
New-code subset (b) 
Previous-code subset (c) 
New-code subset (c) 
Figure 1. Depiction of a sequentially upgraded system. The first release is the original version, labeled 
version A. All the code in version A is new, so subset a is the entire system. The white arrows show when 
each new-code subset begins operation. When the system is updated and rereleased as version B, only the 
lines of code that were modified or added are included in new-code subset b. All of version B is carried over 
to version C, unless it is modified, in which case it becomes part of new-code subset c. This process applies to 
each successive system release. 
29 
it becomes part of new-code subset c; sub-
-;et c begins oper<Ition when version C is 
released. This process applies to each suc-
cessive system release. 
New-code subsets. As Figure 1 illustrates, 
L:ach new version of PASS contains code 
that has been carried forward from previ-
ous versions plus code generated for that 
\·erSIOI1. 
The team fimnd that they can more 
c1dequately satisfy a 
model's assumptions by 
automaticallylogexecution time.lnmany 
installations, however, this luxury may be 
impractical, as in the case of the shuttle. 
MODEL APPLICATION 
The team uses each new-code subset's 
failure and operational execution time his-
tories to generate a reliability prediction 
for the new code in each version. This 
approach places every line of code in PASS 
into one new-code subset 
or another, depending 
<lpplying the model inde-
pendently to the new-
code subset of each ver-
sion. New code 
developed for a particular 
version satisfies the 
Schneidewind model's as-
sumptions: 
+ It is developed with 
a nearly constant process. 
+ It does, as an aggre-
gate, build up the same 
shelf life and execution 
The two most critical 
factors in establishing 
a reliability model's 
credibility are how it 
is validated and 
how its predictions 
are interpreted. 
on the version for which 
it was written. PASS is 
represented as a com-
posite system of separate 
new-code components, 
each with an execution 
history and a reliability, 
connected in series. 
By comparing calcu-
lated and actual failure 
histories, the IBM team 
evaluated several ways to 
represent a composite 
historv. 
+ Cnless it is subsequently changed to 
add capability (thereby becoming new 
code in the next version), it is changed only 
to correct faults. 
An absolutely essential requirement for 
this approach is an accurate code-change 
history, so every failure can be attributed 
only to the version in which it was first intro-
duced. This lets you build a separate failure 
history for each release's new code. 
Estimating exerution tine. The team esti-
mates the execution time of PASS seg-
ments by analyzing test-case records of 
digital flight simulations as well as re-
cords of actual shuttle operations. They 
count test -case executions as operational 
executions only if the simulation fidelity 
matches actual operational conditions 
very closely. They never count prere-
lease test execution time for the new 
code actually being tested as operational 
execution time. 
You can eliminate the tedious manual 
activity of estimating execution time and 
increase the accuracy of your estimates if 
your environment can be designed to 
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system mathematically. 
In the end, they judged a standard statisti-
cal expression to best fit the actual failure 
data. This expression describes the proba-
bility of an event based on a serial relation-
ship of multiple elements that each have 
different probabilities. 
In other words, it represents the failure 
prediction for the overall system as the re-
ciprocal of the sum of the reciprocals of 
the failure predictions of each individual 
element. The composite TPASS measure 
- the estimated average execution time 
until the next failure -is computed by 
T PASS= !/(!ITa+ liTh+ liTe+ l!TJ + ... ) 
where Tm Tb> T0 TJ, and so on are esti-
mates of the time until the next failure for 
each new-code subset, which is deter-
mined by applying the model to each sub-
set individually. 
Because you must assign code to a new-
code subset only when it fails, you need 
not perform the unreasonable task of 
breaking down the entire system, line by 
line, into subsets. You must know which 
subset a line belongs to vnly when it is de-
fective. This is what makes this approach 
so feasible. 
Validation. The IBM team selected sev-
eral models for evaluation, according to 
how compatible their assumptions were 
with PASS. To validate each model, they 
compared its reliability predictions to 
PASS's actual failure history. 
Signific'ant operational failures are vir-
tually nonexistent in PASS, a certified 
man-rated system. To have a larger statis-
tical sample for validation, the team in-
cluded failures of all magnitude. By con-
sidering every fault detected in any 
operational-like execution, whether the 
user was aware of the fault or not, they 
identified about 100 failures from 1980 to 
1990. 
The unit for the failure data was days. 
Depending on the granularity and accu-
racy of your historical data and your 
system's failure intensity, you may find 
hours or even seconds to be more appro-
priate units. 
In this case, the team used the failure 
data for each of six dates between 1986 and 
1989 to obtain six PASS reliability predic-
tions using the Schneidewind model. For 
each of the six predictions, they computed 
the predicted mean time between failure 
by assuming that the next failure did in fact 
occur on the predicted date. They then 
compared each prediction to the actual 
mean time between failures as of that date. 
The Schneidewind model appears to 
provide the most accurate fit to the 12 
years of failure data from this project. For 
all six dates, the Schneidewind model's re-
liability predictions were about 15 percent 
less than the actual average time between 
failures. On the basis of the accuracy and 
consistency of these predictions relative to 
other models, the IBM team selected this 
statistical method to model PASS reliability. 
Credibi&ty. The two most critical factors 
in establishing a reliability model's credi-
bility are how it is validated and how its 
predictions are interpreted. For example, 
you can interpret a conservative predic-
tion as providing a margin of confidence in 
the system's reliability, if the predicted re-
liability already exceeds an established ac-
ceptable level. 
You may not be able to validate that 
you can predict reliability precisely, but 
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you can demonstrate that you can, with 
high confidence, predict a lower bound on 
reliability within a specified environment. 
If you can use historical failure data at a 
series of previous dates (and you have the 
actual data for the failure history following 
those dates) you should be able to compare 
the predictions to the actual reliability and 
evaluate the model's performance. 
You should take all these factors into 
consideration when establishing valida-
tion criteria. This will also significantly 
enhance the credibility of your predictions 
among those who must make decisions on 
the basis of your results. 
Analysis. After much study and analysis, 
the IBM team concluded that the 
Schneidewind model's conservative per-
formance was due to 
+ Conservative execution-time esti-
mates for each version. 
both the reasonableness and the relative 
conservatism of the model's results. You 
can find formulas appropriate for your ap-
plication in any standard statistics text-
book. 
RELIABILITY AND TESTING 
If you don't have a testing strategy, test 
costs are likely to get out of control. With-
out a strategy, each module you test may 
get an equal amount of resources. You 
must treat modules unequally! Allocate 
more test time, effort, and funds to mod-
ules with the highest predicted number of 
failures. 
You can use a reliability model to pre-
dict failures, F(t1,tz), during the intr:rval 
t1h, where t could be execution time or 
tester labor time for a single module (in this 
case, t means execution time). We predict 
failures at t 1 for a continu-
ous interval that has end-We plan to improve the 
accuracy of execution-
time estimates and use the 
model's weighting capa-
bilities to more heavily 
weight the most recent 
failure history in the pre-
dictions. 
+ Slight process im-
provements implemented 
during the development 
cycle of some versions (vi-
olating the model's as-
You must allocate 
more test time, effort, 
and funds to modules 
with the highest 
predicted number of 
failures. 
points at t 1 + 1 and t2. 
We recommend that 
you allocate test time to 
your modules in propor-
tion to F(t1,tz). 
You update the 
model's parameters and 
predictions, according to 
the actual number of fail-
ures, Xo,t
1
, during the 
sumption of a constant process). 
+ Detection and removal of latent 
faults before they became failures in exe-
cution (violating the implied assumption 
that the software is corrected only when a 
failure is encountered). The model's pre-
diction, which is based on an assumed fault 
density remaining in the software until the 
next failure occurs, will underpredict the 
time to next failure if the fault density de-
creases between failures. 
The IBM team is applying the model 
time interval O,[J. As Fig-
ure 2 shows, we predict 
F(t1,tz), att1 during thtb on the basis of the 
model and Xo,t
1
• In Figure 2, t111 is total 
available test time for a single module, hut 
you could make t2 equal to t 111 (that is, you 
could predict to the end of the test period). 
Using these updated predictions, you 
may reallocate test resources. Of course, it 
can be disruptive to reallocate too fre-
quently. Instead, you could predict andre-
allocate at major milestones like the formal 
review of test results. 
to predict a conservative lower bound for Equations. Using the Schneidewind 
PASS reliability. They are also performing model and PASS as an example, here are 
independent statistical analyses using the the minimum equations necessary to ill us-
lations would differ, you could use other 
reliability models to help allocate test re-
sources. 
First you establish two parameters, a 
and ~,which you estimate by applying the 
1 
model to Xo,r 
1
• Once the parameters have 
been established, you can predict four 
quantities that help allocate test resources. 
1. Number of failures during O,t 
F(t) = (a/~)[1 - cxp(-~t)] (1) 
2. Using this quantity, you can predict 
the number of failures during t, ,t2 
F(t1,t2) = (a/~)[1- exp(-~t2)]- Xo,r1 (2) 
3. You can also predict the maximum 
number of failures during the software's 
life (t = oo) 
F(oo) =a/~ (3) 
4. Then, using this quantity, you can 
predict the maximum remaining number 
of failures at t 
R(t) =(a/~)- Xo,r (4) 
So, given n modules, you should allo-
cate test-execution time,~, for each mod-
ule i according to 
(5) ![ 
i=i 
In this equation, although you are using 
the predicted failures for a single module, 
F,{t, h), the total available test-execution 
time (n )[trtd is allocated for each module 
i across n modules. 
Example of use. We now provide an ex-
ample in which we used the interval 0,20 
to estimate a and ~ for each module and 
same failure data to compute 95 percent trate how to use prediction to allocate test Figure 2. Reliability-prediction time scale. We pre-
upper and lower confidence intervals. The resources. The mathematical details of diet F(tJ ,t2), a--t t1 du-ring the time int-erval t1 ,t2~ ba~sd : 
,nru)"~. which = ~"''"' daW<al •tati<- ,n;, mndd h 'v' been pubh,hed d<e- m ''' =del md x,,..rn,h.o= uoh, "- "•~I I 
i, tical formulas, have further confirmed where.4•5 Although the details of the calcu- available test tirne for a single rnodule. 
~~~~~~~=====~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~-~~~ 
IEEE SOFTWARE 31 
-~w.e-,-
Failures a ~ 
during the interval 20,20+T, is shown in 
the last column as X(20,20+ T). 
If you compare Table 1 with Table 2, 
you see that additional failures could occur 
in module 1 (12.95- (12 + 0) = .95 failures) 
and module 2 (12.50 - (11 + 1) = .50 fail-
ures), according to the predicted maxi-
mum number of failures F(""" ). That is, for 
these modules 
' - -
] Module 1 12 1.6915 .1306 
I Module2 11 1.7642 .1411 
Module 3 10 1.7464 .1615 
[X(0,20) + X(20,20+ T)) < F(=). 
F (20,30) R(20) 
failures failures periods 
] Module 1 
1 predicted 12.95 .695 .952 7.6 
The actual F(oo) is known only after all 
testing is complete; it is not known at 
20+T. You need additional procedures for 
deciding how long to test to reach a given 
number of remaining failures. A variant of 
this decision is thestoppingrule.]ohnMusa 
and A. Frank Ackerman use failure inten-
sitv as a criterion for determining when to 
st~p testing_/ 
I actual 13 0 0 I 
Module2 
predicted 12.50 1.322 1.503 14.4 
actual 13 1 2 IMtl edicted 10.81 




When to stop testing? Our recommended 
approach to deciding when to stop testing 
uses reliability prediction to estimate the 
minimum testing time t2 (or the interval 
O,t2) needed to reduce the predicted maxi-
mum number of remaining failures to 
R(t2). 
TABLE 3 
TIME NEEDED TO REACH 16ZERO" REMAINING FAILURES 
(p = .001} 
Tolllltesttime Additional test time Time to find last failure 
(in periods) (in periods) (in periods) 
Module 1 52.9 45.3 64 
Module2 49.0 34.6 44 
To do this, we subtract Equation 1 
from Equation 3, set the result equal to 
R(t2), and solve for t2. 
t2 = { ln [(a/~)/R(t2)]}1~ (6) 
where R(t2) can be established from 
R(t2) = (p)(a/~) (7) 
where p is the desired fraction of remain-
ing failures at t2. 
Substituting Equation 7 in Equation 6 ' 
gives 
t2 = {ln [(1/p)]}/~ (8) 
You can use this result to determine when 
the interval 20,30 to make predictions for Functions for Software measurement pro- to stop testing a given module. Figure 3 
each module, but then used a variable gram6 (available free from William Farr, plots the results for module 1 and module 
amount of test time, ~. which is depen- Naval Surface Warfare Center Code K- 2 for various values of p. From Equation 8 
dent on prediction results. 52, Dahlgren, VA 22448) to the observed and Figure 3 you can derive (for p = .001), 
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results of failure data to obtain estimates of a and~- the data in Table 3: 
applying the model to the failure data for Table 1 shows the total number of failures + The total minimum test time t2 from 
three space-shuttle modules (operational observed during 0,20 and the estimated time 0 to reach essentially 0 remaining 
increments). The modules are executed parameters. failures: .1 percent, corresponding to the 
continuously, 24 hours a day, day after We obtained the predictions for the in- predicted remaining failures: 12.95 x .001 
day. For illustrative purposes, we assume terval20,30 in Table 2 with the equations = .01295 for module 1 and 12.50 x .001 = 
that each period in the test interval is 30 just described. The prediction of F(20,30) .01250 for module 2 (from Equation 7 and 
j days. led to the prediction of T, the allocated Table 2). 
-\fter executing the modules for the number of test-execution time periods. + The additional test time beyond 
0 interval, we applied the Statistical The number of additional failures that 20+T: 52.9-7.6 = 45.3 for module 1 and 
:elin~g a: Estimati-~~=n~o~f=R~e~li~ab~i~li~ty=~w~e~r~e~l~at~e~r~o~b~s~erv=e~d~a~s~t~es~tm~· ~g~c=o=n~tl~·n~u~e~d~=~4~9~.0~-=1~4.=4===3~4~·~6~fo~r~m=o~du~l~e=2~.===~ 








26 · Module 1 
· Module 2 
16 
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 
p remoining failure lrorfion 
Figure 3. Execution time needed to reach the desired fraction of remaininp;failures. 
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+ The actual amount of test time required, start-
ing at 0, for the "last" failure to occur: 64 for module 
1 and 44 for module 2. This quantity comes from 
data, not from prediction. You don't know that it is 
necessarily the last failure. You only know that it was 
the last after 64 periods (1,910 days) for module 1 and 
44 periods (1,314 days) for module 2. 
So, your stopping rule for module 1 is t2 = 52.9 
periods; for module 2, t2 = 49.0 periods. 
Applying these methods and models is feasible today, but we recommend that you combine 
your use of a model with an evaluation of its assump-
tions and constraints, a validation of its predictions, 
and an understanding of how to interpret its predic-
tions. Doing these things will lend credibility to your 
re~ts. + 
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